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Acronyms and abbreviations 
ANPPCAN African Network for the Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect 
CFA Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community) 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ENDA Environnement et Développement du Tiers Monde 
ICI International Cocoa Initiative 
ILO International Labour Organization 
ILO-IPEC ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour 
LUTRENA Lutte contre le Trafic des Enfants en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre 
MAEJT Mouvement Africain des Enfants et Jeunes Travailleurs 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières 
UCW Understanding Children’s Work 
WACAP West Africa Cocoa Agriculture Project 
 
Definitions and labels 
Children attending Qur’ānic school go by different labels: Talibés (Wolof); Garibous (Dioula); Al-majiri 
(Hausa); Almudos (Fulbe).  
Muslim teachers are labelled differently: Marabout (derivative of the Arabic word Murābiṭ) is commonly used 
in Francophone countries; Mallam (Hausa version of the Arabic word Mu’allim) in Anglophone countries; and 
occasionally Alfa (Yoruba term for a Muslim cleric).  
Qur’ānic schools are named differently according to their type and language: Traditional schools are usually 
called Daara (Wolof derivative of the Arabic word dar, house) or Makarantar (Hausa for a place of learning and 
reciting), whereas schools associated with Islamic modernism and incorporating other topics than the Qur’ān 
are called Madrasa, plural Madāris (Arabic for school), Arabic schools or Islamiyya schools.  
In this paper, the term  
Talibé is used as a generic label for boys (and some girls) learning the Qur’ān in a traditional school, whether 
they are involved in begging or not. Specific note is made when the information pertain to Talibés who beg. 
Marabout is used for the Islamic teacher leading the school and teaching children the Qur’an with or without 
assistant teachers, and  
Daara for the school.  
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Preface 
A third of all children in West and Central Africa are estimated to work full- or part-time, paid or unpaid. Many 
of children are involved in hazardous and harmful economic activities, such as working in mines. Some are also 
exploited for sex and trafficked. Even if the work itself is not hazardous, many working children do not have 
access to education or drop out of school due to the opportunity costs for parents of keeping children in 
school and out of work. However, some children do combine work and school and earning an income may 
enable children to continue their schooling. Where the quality of education is poor or children are exposed to 
violence in schools, some children may prefer work to school. In some contexts, children derive a sense of 
meaning and responsibility from their work and the contributions they make to the family. To take them away 
from work without replacing the meaning and status they may receive can result in worse outcomes. 
The prevention and response to child labour and exploitation in the region has fallen short in terms of quality, 
impact and scale. Over the past decade, much has been learned about what works and what doesn’t in 
relation to child labour, exploitation and trafficking. Internationally, Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) has 
done much to strengthen the evidence base. Many other organizations and researchers from different 
academic perspectives have contributed to a more differentiated analysis of children’s work and of prevention 
and response efforts (e.g. Bourdillon, Myers, White, Boyden, Liebel, Woodhead). 
Reviews and evaluations of anti-trafficking efforts have highlighted the need to distinguish between child 
migration and child trafficking and to avoid labelling all forms of child movement as child trafficking. These 
evaluations also emphasise the need for a better understanding of child mobility and the cultural, social and 
economic foundations of children’s work in a broader context of social and economic mobility. A regional child 
mobility initiative was launched in 2008 to improve understanding of the cultural foundations of ‘child labour’, 
‘child migration’ and ‘child trafficking’ and the role children’s work and mobility plays in children’s 
socialisation. The work done by the child mobility initiative is an important effort to rethink and redevelop 
prevention and responses to child labour that take social and cultural concepts of child development and 
education, social mobility and social protection into account. From this perspective, children and migration are 
linked to transitions within the life course and to rites of passage, whereby migration is part of becoming an 
adult, to earn cash and to get married. This perspective complements, and to some extent challenges, other 
approaches to child labour that focus more narrowly on poverty reduction, human resource development, or 
the application of international labour standards. 
Five thematic briefing papers have been developed for types of child labour that have particular relevance for 
children in West and Central Africa. The focus is on the most pressing forms of child labour in the region, types 
of work that are receiving the greatest level of attention and have seen most resistance to change: Children in 
artisanal quarries and mines; Talibé children (Qur’ānic school pupils who are begging) in Sahelian countries; 
Children in commercial agriculture; Children in the informal urban sector; and Child domestic workers. 
The purpose of the child labour briefing papers is to synthesise the empirical evidence of effective approaches 
to child labour and exploitation and identify approaches that have not worked or are unlikely to work with the 
current levels of human and financial resources. The briefing papers are aimed towards professionals working 
on child protection, education and social policy in countries in West and Central Africa. Each briefing paper 
presents evidence on the following aspects: description of the phenomenon, situation, trends, scale, impact on 
children; effective approaches to preventing child labour and exploitation. 
Acknowledgements: The briefing papers were developed in collaboration between the UNICEF education and 
child protection sections in West and Central Africa. Materials and comments were provided by country-level 
child protection and education staff. The regional education section provided the funding for the briefing 
papers. The papers were researched and written by Dr. Dorte Thorsen, anthropologist at the University of 
Sussex.  
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Introduction 
This briefing paper focuses on children in Sahelian countries, who are enrolled in Qur’ānic schools and beg as 
part of their education. In the region, Islamic education predates colonization and the establishment of 
mission and secular state schools. Ideologies about religion, politics and education have shaped how Qur’ānic 
schools have transformed and proliferated over time and have resulted in a wide variety of schools today. 
Some schools – the Daaras or Makarantar – are founded on Islamic traditionalism and a Master-disciple 
pedagogy, while others - the Madāris (Arabic schools) – are founded on Islamic modernism and combine the 
study of the Qur’ān with subjects from the curriculum of state schools and a teaching style resembling that of 
state schools.
[13, 16, 19, 48, 49, 50]
 Pupils in Madāris pay school fees and are not sent out to beg,
[29]
 whereas 
education in Daaras often is free or almost free but implies that pupils – Talibés – may beg for alms.
[3, 16, 17, 22, 31]
 
However, some Marabouts have found alternative ways of maintaining their Daaras and do not sent their 
Talibés out to beg.
[19, 40]
 The specific focus in this paper on Talibés who beg provides a partial picture of 
religious education in Qur’ānic schools. 
International agencies, NGOs and media often equate the highly visible phenomenon of child beggars in large 
cities, such as Dakar, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Nouakchott, Kano and Maiduguri with Talibés, and with 
forced begging. Many Talibés are also perceived to have been trafficked, because they have moved from rural 
villages to Qur’ānic schools in urban areas within their country or in neighbouring countries.
[3, 15, 44, 51]
 
Based on the review of a broad range of literature – spanning from newspaper articles, to reports of 
commissioned research, to Master and Doctoral theses, to peer reviewed academic publications – this briefing 
paper aims to unpack why children become Talibés and the conditions in which they live, including the time 
spent begging. The paper also raises a number of issues that need further investigation. 
Situating Talibés in the 2000s 
A typical Talibé is a young boy of school-going age, but girls also 
attend Qur’ānic schools. Girls almost always study in Daaras close to 
their home so they can continue living with their family and they are 
not sent out to beg.
[3]
 Boys also study close to home but may also 
relocate to Qur’ānic schools away from their family, in which case 
they are more likely to beg. Begging is usually done by younger 
students while older ones, who have advanced beyond 
memorization of the Qur’ān to study mysticism and other core 
subjects, do not beg but help supervise younger students.
[5, 15, 34]
  
Talibés come from all ethnic groups, especially in countries like 
Mauritania, Niger, the Gambia, Senegal and Mali and Guinea, where 
over 85 per cent of the population are Muslims.
[19]
 Some parents use 
cultural explanations along the lines of ethnic origin to justify why 
their children are not sent to Daaras where begging is part of the 
curriculum, e.g. the Felupe, Balantas and Papel of Guinea Bissau.
[17]
 
While children from certain ethnic groups may be overrepresented 
among the Talibés who beg, using ethnic origin as an explanation for 
child begging misses important inequalities. Children from some 
regions are more likely to become Talibés than those from other 
regions for reasons ranging from lack of access to state schools in 
Benin. In 2001, 89 per cent of the Talibés 
were boys and 11 per cent girls. The 
Talibés' average age was 12 years. Age at 
which children begin Qur’ānic school: 
 3-4 years 12 per cent 
 5-8 years 43 per cent 
 9-12 years 30 per cent 
 13+ years 15 per cent 
(Sample N=485) 
[3, p. 10]
 
 
Senegal. In 2009, 25 per cent of the 
children who left home, studied the 
Qur’ān. Among the boys, 43 per cent left 
for this reason compared to 4 per cent of 
the girls. The mean age for beginning 
Qur’ānic school was 7.2 years; two in 
three Talibé had begun before the age of 
8 years but only 14 per cent had begun 
before they turned five. There was a 
noticeable decline in Talibés older than 
12 years. (Sample N=2,400 households) 
[26, p. 32, 49]
 
 
Mauritania. In 2006, 40 per cent of the 
Talibés interviewed were aged 6-8 years; 
48 per cent 9-10 years and 12 per cent 
11 years or above. (Sample N=300 
Talibés). 
[5, p. 12-13]
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remote areas, to relative poverty, to child circulation within kin groups and to the importance given to 
religion.
[15, 30, 49]
  
Whether or not children beg as part of their Qur’ānic education 
depends on the wealth, reputation and moral stance of the 
Marabout. The fact that more Fulbe than Wolof children (Talibé and 
non-Talibé) beg in Dakar and two-thirds of the Fulbe child beggars 
are Talibés,
[44]
 may suggest a variety of things: that they attend 
poorer Daaras; that they primarily migrate to urban areas to pursue 
Islamic education; that demand for well-established Daara places is 
higher than the availability; and for non-Talibés that they either have 
few urban-based relatives or that these relatives are unable to 
mediate employment for migrant children. It is therefore important 
to examine in greater detail why some ethnic groups are 
overrepresented and to consider issues, such as gender, age, 
inequality and processes of marginalization. 
Census data and the UNESCO education database do not offer much 
statistical information on the different types of Qur’ānic schools 
However, small-scale studies offer some indication of the situation. 
In Niger, for example, more than 40,000 Qur’ānic schools existed in 
the early 2000s and in Chad 45 per cent of children in education 
attended Qur’ānic schools.
[19]
 Similarly in Senegal, around the same 
number of children were educated in Qur’ānic schools as in state 
schools in 1991.
[39]
 In two of the Sufi city-states – Touba of the 
Murides (Wolof) and Medina Gounass of the Tijaniyya (Fulbe) – the 
Caliphs closed state schools in the 1990s due to the fact that the 
number of children attending Madāris was decreasing and to 
prevent a further drain of students away from Islamic eduction.
[30]
  
The rejection of state schools cannot be explained by Islamic traditionalism. The first Madrasa in Touba in 
Senegal opened in 1969.
[37]
 In northern Nigeria the Fityan al-Islam organization is behind a great proliferation 
of Islamiyya schools (Madāris). They opened the first school in 1972; by 1983 they ran 183 schools and taught 
11,835 students in Kano state alone, and by 2000 they had 2,881 schools with 302,514 students across 
northern Nigeria.
[48, 49]
 In Mali and Burkina Faso, Daaras are important educational institutions, whereas in 
northern Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon they have gradually been replaced by Madāris.
[19, 35]
  
Without reliable statistical data, it is difficult to assess the importance of Qur’ānic schools vis-à-vis state 
schools and the degree to which children enrolled in public schools also pursue religious education outside 
school hours, as studies in Cameroon
[20]
 and Ghana
[13]
 show. Furthermore, it is impossible to assess the 
number of pupils enrolled in different types of Qur’ānic schools, let alone in Daaras, which are among the 
most marginalized institutions in the educational system.
[30]
  
Reasons Why Children Become Talibés 
Some reports argue that poor parents send children away, including to study in Daaras, to reduce the number 
of mouths to feed within the household.
[15, 44, 46]
 This is a utilitarian but too simplified view of long-standing 
child circulation and fostering practices. This view reduces family decisions to pure economics without 
considering the importance for children and parents of strengthening social alliances, the prospects for 
education,
[24, 34, 38]
 and, in certain communities, of dissociating themselves from the stigma of slave origin.
[28]
 
The poverty narrative assumes that children are consumers and not producers.
[34]
 Although parents often 
mention poverty as a reason for sending children to Qur’ānic schools, poverty cannot be used as an 
Guinea Bissau.  Parents feel it is their 
obligation to educate their children and 
by sending children to study the Qur’ān, 
they hope to be rewarded by God.
[17, p. 32]
 
Senegal.  Wolof farmers emphasised 
that they loved their children, needed 
their labour and could provide for them. 
They sent children to Qur’ānic schools 
due to spiritual, educational and moral 
considerations. They waived their own 
needs for their sons’ labour to 
demonstrate their membership in Islam, 
hoping that the discipline in the Daara 
would mould their sons’ character and 
bring them closer to Allah.
[34, p. 59]
  
Senegal.  71 per cent of the household 
heads would like to place a child in an 
apprenticeship, whereas 55 per cent 
would unreservedly place a child with a 
Marabout in the community and 23 per 
cent with a migrant Marabout. 
[26, p. 43-44]
 
Benin.  In 2001, 73 per cent of the 
Talibés were placed with a Marabout by 
their parents; 10 per cent were placed by 
another family member; 3 per cent came 
by other paths; and 1 per cent did not 
know how they came to the Daara 
[3, p. 12]
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explanatory factor in isolation. The decision to send one or more children to a Daara is intertwined with 
religious and moral norms, pedagogical beliefs, and parents’ own experience and broader processes of 
marginalisation and exclusion.
[3]
 Moreover, not all Talibés come from the poorest quintile.
[17, 26]
  
In the Sahel, with its long history of Islam, many parents give priority 
to studying the Qur’ān and the Daara system is deeply embedded in 
how many people think about education.
[5, 15, 16, 28, 44]
 Parents’ 
motivations for sending a child to a distant Qur’ānic school are part 
of their own religious beliefs. By ensuring the reproduction of 
religious practices and sacrificing the benefits of keeping children at 
home, parents hope to be rewarded by Allah.
[17, 34]
 Their religious 
position vis-à-vis their local community of Muslims may also 
influence educational choices, as the family’s social standing may 
increase if their children study the Qur’ān successfully or they have 
good relations with a powerful Marabout.
[17, 34]
 Finally, parents are 
motivated by their aspirations for their children, as they believe 
Talibés acquire life skills and come closer to Allah by studying the 
Qur’ān.
[3]
 Those who advance in their Islamic studies will earn respect 
and accumulate symbolic and material wealth by: leading prayers, 
writing charms and making protective amulets, and by becoming part 
of vibrant and influential networks of Islamic scholars.
[34, 38]
  
Parents rarely send all their children to Qur’ānic schools. In poor 
communities, it is common to diversify children’s educational paths 
by enrolling at least one child in formal education, sending one or more children to a Qur’ānic school, arrange 
apprenticeships, keeping some children at home to work on the farm, while permitting others to migrate for 
work or to help relatives.
[26, 28, 31, 42]
 Many parents carefully consider whether a child can endure the hardship 
of living in a Daara and whether the chosen Marabout has a good reputation and provides his students with 
opportunities for a better future.
[14, 17, 28] 
Poverty plays a role at a more structural level. The generally poor socio-economic situation of most countries 
in the region, and in particular of rural regions, means that few public services are available for the rural 
population.
[17]
 The choice is not necessarily between enrolling a child in the local primary school or sending 
him to a Daara elsewhere. It may be between sending a child to a relative to get access to formal schooling 
and sending a child to a Marabout; or sending a child away to pursue formal education instead of being in the 
local Qur’ānic school.
[15, 17, 57]
 Decisions are rooted in the availability and quality of education options. 
The appeal of public schools may have decreased due to spending cuts, deregulation and privatisation 
following neo-liberal economic policies
 [30, 49]
 and to young people’s difficulties finding paid employment after 
completing basic education.
[16]
 However, parents are sometimes critical of the local Qur’ānic schools too and 
justify sending children to distant Daaras in order to ensure education of higher quality.
[17]
 Generally, parents 
appreciate a broader education for their children, combining the study of the Qur’ān with literacy, numeracy 
and other skills that enhance the children’s job prospects.
[3, 15, 17]
  
There are few indications in the reviewed literature of children’s own reasons for pursuing education in Islamic 
institutions. Some children obey the wishes of their parents despite having other preferences, others may be 
motivated by the prospect of future travels.
[3, 17]
 Given the importance of migration for rural, and perhaps also 
urban, children
[21]
 and the number of West African students enrolled in Islamic colleges and universities in 
Morocco,
[10]
 programming needs to examine children’s own motivations for enrolling in Qur’ānic education. 
Mali. In the 1980s, public school 
attendance declined, while enrolment in 
Qur’ānic and community schools 
increased
[16, p. 18] 
 
Benin. My father decided I should go to 
Qur’ānic school, I would have liked to go 
to the French school.
[3, p. 22]
 
 
Senegal. Several Talibés in Thiès came to 
the Daara after having dropped out of 
the public school because the costs were 
too high or they underachieved.
[15, p. 15]
 
 
Guinea Bissau. A group of adolescent 
boys confirmed that they would all like 
to leave for the Gambia to study the 
Qur’ān, except a 12-year old boy who 
said he would prefer to go to Portugal 
and become rich.
[17, p. 28]
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Ways in Which Talibés Become Beggars 
Many children are placed with a Marabout by their parents or, occasionally, by another relative who takes 
responsibility for their education outside the home.
[3, 5, 15, 17, 26, 31, 34, 46]
 A small number of Talibés join a 
Marabout on their own account.
[3]
 Although research focusing on Talibé beggars has examined parents’ 
motives for sending children to Qur’ānic schools and Marabouts' teaching practices, little is known about how 
parents choose a Daara for their children or how Marabouts recruit students for their Daara. 
Explanations of why Talibés have to beg, highlight the need of 
the Marabout to feed the children in his Daara, since poor 
parents do not pay any fees to the Marabout.
[3, 17]
 Some religious 
teachers are accused of being 'false Marabouts' who do not 
teach the Qur’ān and force children to beg by dispensing harsh 
punishments if they do not bring back a fixed amount of money 
every day.
[22, 44, p. 41]
  
At one end of the spectrum, Marabouts are represented as 
having no other choice than sending Talibés out to beg. This is 
linked with deteriorating rural economies over the past forty 
years or more. In the past, many Qur’ānic schools were rural, 
where students lived on the Marabout's farm, took a place 
similar to that of an unmarried son in terms of productive 
activities, and learned the Qur’ān at dawn and dusk.
[38]
 
Generally, the local community supported the Marabouts’ work, 
and some Daaras housed up to 100 Talibés.
[8, 16, 55]
  
The severe droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, persistent 
economic crises and the effects of structural adjustment 
programmes have decreased people’s ability and willingness to 
support large Qur’ānic schools. This has resulted in the shrinking 
size of schools and an increase in expenses for the Marabouts.
[3, 
6, 8, 17]
 Alongside the migration of rural people to cities and 
towns
[4]
, the adverse economic climate has also prompted 
transformations in the economic base of many Marabouts. 
Brotherhoods, like the Muridiyyah of Senegal, which was 
founded on groundnut cultivation,
[16]
 have shifted their base from rural to urban economies,
[7]
 leading to the 
evolution of new forms of Qur’ānic schools.
[28]
 This transformation is often used to explain the increasing 
numbers of Talibés begging in the streets. However, since not all Qur’ānic school students beg, it is 
important to examine whether urban Talibés are involved in other types of remunerative activities.  
At the other end of the spectrum, Marabouts are portrayed as exploitative and as recruiting Talibés with the 
purpose of increasing their revenues by forcing children to beg. Evidence of Talibés spending time begging 
instead of receiving an education has been documented for more than a decade in Senegal
[32]
 and Nigeria.
[33]
 
As such malpractice may be possible due to lack of state or religious regulation, it is important to examine the 
political economy of education in each country to understand why the state has not issued, or does not 
enforce, legislation to regulate religious education. 
At this end of the spectrum, children's relocation to urban Daaras is often analysed through the lens of 
trafficking. Contrary to migrant children working in cocoa framing, who are described as having been bought, 
migrant Talibés are seen as victims of trafficking primarily due to the begging. Relocation to neighbouring 
countries or over long distances adds to the perception of these children being vulnerable.
[22]
 The prevalence 
Parents’ decision to send a child to Qur’ānic 
school is gendered: in Mauritania the 
father made the decision in 72 per cent of 
the cases; the mother or another relative in 
16 and 12 per cent of the cases 
respectively.
[5]
 In Senegal the father made 
the decision in 86 per cent of the cases; the 
mother was involved in 8 per cent of the 
cases. 41 per cent of the boys left their 
village with the Marabout, 27 per cent 
were brought by their father and 21 per 
cent by other family members.
[26, p. 35, 48]
  
Senegal. I'm a Marabout. I used to have a 
Daara with around 30 pupils in my village. 
As the parents didn't have the means to 
help me take charge of the children, I was 
obliged to feed the children and buy 
clothes, medicines, etc. for them, pay my 
rent of 80,000 CFA francs [US$ 168] and 
teach them the Qur’ān. It was hard and 
then during the farming season many of 
the parents recalled their children so I had 
very few to help me on my farm. After the 
harvest all the students came back but I 
only had grain for two to three months, so I 
was obliged to quit the village for Dakar. I 
now have 50 Talibés in Dakar.
[44, p. 11-12]
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of migrant Talibés differs greatly from one country to another, 
but existing studies do not allow to say whether this is linked to 
general migration patterns or other dynamics. 
The importance of social relations between the Marabout and 
his Talibés is rarely mentioned despite the fact that around half 
the children learn the Qur’ān under a Marabout with whom 
they are related, or with whom older siblings or children from 
the village have studied.
[3, 14, 15, 17, 28, 52]
 Many of the children 
travelling from their home to the Daara with the Marabout 
are thus travelling with a close or distant relative in agreement 
with their parents or guardians.  
To avoid blanket accusations of trafficking, parents' response to 
situations in which children are exploited need to be 
examined, as do the ways in which this may transform 
educational strategies in the long run
1
. Important questions to 
ask are whether parents send their children to other types of 
schools, to other Marabouts, travel to urban Daaras to check on the conditions and, if their practices appear 
unchanged despite reports of maltreatment of children, why they do not believe such reports. 
Terms of Learning and Living in Daaras 
Traditionally, the education offered in Daaras is at the 
elementary level. Students begin to learn the Qur’ān by rote 
and then gradually learn to read and write Arabic through 
writing verses on wooden slates.
[1, 3, 16, 17, 48]
 The most common 
pedagogical methods are one-on-one teaching or small-group 
teaching of students at the same level of learning but of 
different ages.
[1]
 This is a significant difference from public 
schools, where the teacher-to-pupil ratio often is considerably 
higher. In Burkina Faso, for example, the average ratio was one 
teacher to 55.3 pupils in 2007/2008.
[23]
 Like in state schools, 
some Marabouts use corporal punishment to discipline their 
students when they misbehave or recite verses from the Qur’ān 
incorrectly.
[1, 17]
 The length of elementary education varies 
between four and ten years
[16]
, depending on the child's aptitude, the Marabout's pedagogical skills and the 
time devoted to studying. Only the youngest students (under 15 years of age) beg. Older students are less 
numerous as they have proceeded to more advanced studies or have left the Daara to work.
[5, 15, 34]
 
In the literature on forced begging the time dedicated to studying is often used as an indicator of whether a 
Marabout has genuine educational motives or primarily is interested in the money Talibés can beg. Talibés 
who study the Qur’ān most of the day and only beg around meal times
[15]
 are usually seen as being in 
accordance with tradition and not as involved in forced begging. The Talibés who study primarily at dawn and 
dusk or in the evening are more difficult to assess. First, Daaras do not offer full-time education only. In some 
places, traditional Qur’ānic schools have transformed to give children the possibility of studying the Qur’ān 
outside normal school or work hours, as is the case in Ghana.
[13]
 In Benin, Marabouts sometimes support 
Talibés' formal education but it is also common that parents or other relatives pay for the expenses related to 
                                                          
1 Jacquemin's study of child domestic workers in Côte d’Ivoire shows that parents adapt with whom they place daughters in response to 
girls being given disappointingly low compensation for their work[25] and Thorsen's study of rural child migrants in Burkina Faso that 
parents worry about exploitation and maltreatment.[41] 
Senegal. According to tradition, a Talibé 
spends one hour per day passing from 
house to house reciting verses from the 
Qur’ān to receive small gifts that 
contribute to the subsistence of the 
Daara. In this context, begging is a means 
to teach the child simplicity and humility. 
But the way that begging has become the 
primary activity of Talibés today cannot 
be understood as an element of religious 
education.
[44, p. 24]
 
Guinea Bissau. According to a Marabout, 
begging does not belittle a child but 
makes him humble and resistant and 
therefore it cannot be considered 
exploitation or suffering.
[17, p. 36]
  
Talibés' place of origin: In Senegal, 60.5 per 
cent of the Talibés interviewed were from 
Senegal; 26.3 per cent from Guinea Bissau; 
7.4 per cent from the Gambia and 5.7 per 
cent from other countries.
[22, p. 28]
 In 
Burkina Faso, 98 per cent of the Talibés 
were Burkinabé and 2 per cent from Mali, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Togo.
[40]
  
Benin. In 2001, 20 per cent of the Talibés 
were closely related to their Marabout; 28 
per cent were distantly related; 51 per cent 
were not related through kinship.
[3, p. 12]
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formal education.
[3]
 In Côte d’Ivoire, migrant children sometimes 
combine work with religious education.
[57]
 Daaras organised around 
children's work or begging for the Marabout are in line with the 
way in which rural farm and itinerant Qur’ānic schools functioned 
in the past,
[28, 38]
 but Talibés may also spend so much time begging 
that it is at the expense of their achievements in school.
[16, 22]
  
No comparative analysis has been done of study hours in countries, 
such as Senegal, where Talibés often beg,
[17, 22, 47]
 Ghana, where 
Daaras provide after-school religious education
[13]
 and the Gambia, 
where a ban on begging is enforced and Marabouts are interviewed 
by the police if any of their students are found begging.
[17, 52]
 
Number of study hours is just one indicator among others and the 
diversity in educational practices makes it an inadequate proxy 
indicator of exploitation. 
Talibés begging in the street walk long distances to stand at 
crossroads, mosques, pass restaurants, markets, banks and bus 
stations where they hope to receive alms in food or cash.
[3, 5, 34, 46]
 
Talibés may also work in the urban informal economy or collect 
firewood to sell for the Marabout. Talibés interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch in 2010 revealed that, while some Talibés only beg a 
couple of hours per day, others beg up to 10 hours most days.
[22]
  
Some Marabouts in Senegal set begging quotas which they expect 
their students to meet. Such quotas include rice, sugar or money.
[22]
 
The sums Talibés earn through begging are relatively small and few 
marabous make large profits, though in some of the very large Daaras the sheer number of Talibés means that 
some Marabouts earn more than is needed to maintain the Daara.
[15]
  
Certain Marabouts demand higher quotas on Thursdays and Fridays to benefit from the piety of people 
attending the mosques, which in turn requires Talibés to beg up to 16 hours on those days.
[22]
 This practice is 
most common in Dakar where the average begging quota is 40 per cent higher on Fridays, whereas in other 
large cities the quota is unchanged or only slightly higher. It is therefore important to examine local practices 
surrounding begging in each context. Much attention has been focused on the time Talibés spend begging to 
meet their Marabout's quota and to obtain sufficient food for themselves.
[cf. 22, 46]
 This tends to overshadow 
information about Talibés' other activities. In Burkina Faso, a study showed that 98 per cent of Talibés do not 
work,
[40]
 but it is important to examine the extent to which Talibés also work or attend other forms of 
education. Talibés interviewed in both Senegal and Burkina Faso revealed that they may also spend time on 
leisure activities with or without their Marabout's consent.
[40]
 
Risks, Abuse and Punishment 
Talibés can be subject to abuse at many levels. A number of 
studies suggest that sending children to Qur’ānic schools 
amounts to child abuse because of the begging involved, the 
fact that many Talibés are dirty and wear rags when they are on 
the streets to beg, and Marabouts' use of corporal 
punishment.
[3, 15]
 Furthermore, it is suggested that many Talibés 
are trafficked.
[see 17]
 Such broad generalisations are not useful 
because they ignore the diversity in children's experiences. 
While some Talibés find the living conditions in the Daara so 
Benin.  46.2 per cent of Talibés also 
pursued formal education and of these, 
68.5 per cent were supported by their 
Marabout while 24.3 per cent were 
supported by others, 2.8 per cent had 
their school fees paid for by an NGO and 
2.2 per cent paid their own school fees.
 [3, 
p. 16]
 
Senegal. Average begging quota in 2010 
(in CFA francs) 
 Normal Days Fridays 
Dakar 463 642 
Saint-Louis 228 228 
Thiès 254 268 
Mbour 246 246 
[22, p. 32] 
Burkina Faso. Most Talibés are obliged to 
beg to supplement their daily ration of 
food in the Daara. They are well aware of 
their dependence on the generosity of 
alms givers and say «ça dépend, si tu t’es 
levé du bon pied ou non».
[40]
  
Burkina Faso. 54 per cent of Talibés 
spent time on leisure activities, such as 
table football (34 per cent), video clubs 
(31 per cent) and football (18 per 
cent).
[40] 
Senegal. Talibés in one Daara bought a 
football with their own money and were 
allowed to play by the Marabout as long 
as they fulfilled their begging quotas and 
studied well. Other Marabouts ban all 
leisure activities and punish 
transgressions.
[22, p. 57-58]
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deplorable that they return home or choose to live in the 
streets, others find they are treated appropriately even if 
punished from time to time.
[17, 22, 40]
  
Parent’s acceptance of different forms of suffering must be 
understood in its local context. First, parents who perceive 
begging as work,
[34]
 are not necessarily concerned about their children spending more time working than 
studying, especially not if the children retain some of the money they earn. In contrast, parents who are 
opposed to child begging 
[17]
 are unlikely to choose Daaras where begging is involved.  
Second, the issue of appearance may result from poor living conditions and the Marabout's negligence,
[22]
 but 
it may also be the 'dress code' for beggars in general to increase their chances of receiving alms. Elsewhere it 
has been shown that the right demeanour is important and also that young children are successful in begging 
due to people feeling pity for them, whereas older children earn much less because people think they are lazy 
or delinquent (Ethiopia
[2]
; Haiti
[27]
; and Indonesia
[9]
). The differences between Daaras with regard to how 
Talibés are treated, the sufficiency of food and treatment in case of illness affects a child’s development. 
Research suggests that Talibés may be stunted in their growth due to malnutrition, endemic and untreated 
diseases.
[3, 16]
 While such evidence should influence policy responses, it is also important to examine the 
impact on children’s physical development comparatively to ascertain whether siblings at home or living with 
other relatives are better off. 
Third, the issue of corporal punishment needs to be analysed in 
greater depth. Adults may consider the sanctions they inflict on 
children to have a positive effect on children's behaviour and 
socialisation. Disciplining may involve deprivations of various 
types – from withholding food to barring the child from watching 
TV – corporal punishment, such as a slap or a beating and verbal 
abuse and curses.
[18, 28]
 Talibés experiences of discipline are 
diverse and so are parents' views on harsh forms of disciplining. 
Some fathers have themselves been severely beaten in Qur’ānic 
schools but are not deterred from sending their sons to a 
Marabout,
[44]
 and yet not all parents approve of the harsh 
treatment of Talibés.
[17, 28]
 
Finally, children begging in the street are vulnerable to the risks of 
traffic accidents.
[22]
 Talibés may also be verbally abused while 
begging.
[15]
 Some Talibés may become street children if they leave 
the Daara and do not feel they can return home.
[17]
 Some children 
join kin or other social relations in the migrant community aim to 
become successful migrants.
[43]
 To find children integrating into 
the migrant community is difficult but would be of interest for 
programming. 
Implications for Children of Begging as Part of 
their Qur’ānic Schooling 
The mediatised images of skinny Talibés in rags begging in the street give a very strong impression of the 
suffering to which these children are subjected. However, the images are offered without contextualising the 
importance of mobility in the Sahelian countries, local practices of child rearing, and general educational 
constraints shaped by economic hardship and government policies. Knowledge is also lacking about local 
Burkina Faso.  According to Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) 44 per cent of the 
street children in Ouagadougou in 2004 
were former Talibés.
[40]
  
Burkina Faso. In the presence of the 
Marabout, 74 per cent of the Talibés said 
they were not mistreated. Corporal 
punishment seems to be inherent in 
studying the Qur’ān and Marabouts 
declare that the knowledge of the Qur’ān 
is so precious that it cannot be learned 
with ease.
[40]
 
Mauritania. Beatings are by far the most 
common type of punishment in Daaras. 
213 of 300 Talibés had received a beating 
of some form, followed by 84 and 37 of 
300 who had been intimidated or 
deprived of something respectively. The 
three most common reasons for such 
punishment were absence (288 of 300 
Talibés), faulty recitation of the Hadiths 
(175 of 300) and lack of attention (68 of 
300).
[5, p. 18] 
Benin. 94.5 per cent of Talibés had 
received a slap; 48.6 per cent been had 
slapped on the head; 12.2 per cent had 
to restudy a wrongly recited verse, 3.9 
per cent had been denied food.
[3, p. 17]
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norms that may protect children from a variety of risks in places 
of education, play and residence. The image of begging talibés 
often hints at a critique of Muslim parents and Marabouts, 
which does not take fully into account changes that are 
already happening, such as the development of Madāris for 
full-time education and Daaras that are suited to children who 
attend state schools or work. The hazards should not be ignored 
but the failure to see that so-called traditional practices are changing in diverse ways, hinders identifying how 
best to protect and support these children and their families.  
Child Development, Education and Learning 
It is important to look at local practices of child rearing to understand the underlying ideologies among adults 
for the expectations they have of boys and girls of different ages but also for understanding the expectations 
children and young people have of their parents. The relocation of children for educational purposes is rooted 
in the view that children do not belong to the birth parents only but to the extended kin group. Consequently, 
a child’s socialisation and learning of various skills is the responsibility of a large group of people.
[11, 36, 54, 56]
 
This is particularly important when the child is related to the Marabout through kinship, as were at least 
one-fifth of the Talibés interviewed in Benin in 2001.
[3]
  
Educational relocation is also rooted in the belief that distance helps children adapt to all kinds of situations 
and stand on their own feet.
[46]
 Some studies portrait the sending of children to Qur’ānic schools as parental 
neglect and as a denial of a proper childhood. Talibés are reported to miss their parents and parents to be 
withholding contact to prevent Talibés from running away from the Daara. Other studies report that parents 
miss and worry about children who have left.
[3, 15, 17, 21]
 Parents and children regularly state that good 
education involves repressing emotions and being able to endure. Suffering in different forms is accepted as 
an integral part of socialisation and of acquiring knowledge.
[12, 16, 17]
  
Parents' views on the virtues of Qur’ānic schools vary. Generally, Daaras are viewed as important educational 
institutions, and some parents in Senegal argue that in addition to learning the Qur’ān, rural children learn 
about the urban economy, other languages and cultures when studying away from home.
[17, 34]
 In their view, 
urban and rural Daaras are similar and the only difference is that urban Talibés’ ‘farm’ is the street and their 
‘crop’ is money instead of groundnuts.
[34, p. 63]
 Underlying this perspective is a conceptualisation of begging as 
work and a reluctance to criticise a religious authority, such as the Marabout. 
However, other parents, as well as child rights advocates, stress that Talibés spend excessive amounts of time 
begging for alms and note that the children may not attain the level of religious knowledge they and their 
parents had hoped for.
[17, 46]
 As these Talibés are also likely to miss out on technical training and on gaining 
skills in farming, it is argued that the children’s Qur’ān studies may end up undermining their future 
possibilities.
[17]
 Underlying this perspective is a broad critique of Daaras. Yet, it is questionable whether 
Talibés’ job prospects are undermined in reality. Many Talibés leave their studies in their early teens when 
they join the pool of young people with little education who compete for jobs in the informal economy. They 
are neither better nor worse off than other children and youth of this age when it comes to finding 
employment. Although recommendations were made in 2001 by an assembly of authorities from the Muslim 
community, law enforcing institutions and child protection officers in Benin to incorporate practical skills 
training in Qur’ānic schools,
[3]
 the reviewed literature does not address this issue.  
Educational Trajectories and Upward Social Mobility 
The focus on Talibés who beg provides an account of living and learning conditions in Daaras that does not 
distinguish between students of different ages. No accounts exist of the progression from entry-level Qur’ānic 
student to more specialised Islamic learning and becoming assistant teachers. Apart from situations where 
Talibés leave their Daara to live on the streets, little is known about Talibés' activities once they finish Qur’ānic 
Senegal. 37 per cent of the child beggars 
(Talibé and non-Talibé) are in contact 
with their family. Children aged 2-8 years 
are more likely to have lost contact with 
their families.
[44, p. 40]
 Most children enter 
a Daara when they are 6-8 years old. 
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school and make the transition to income-earning activities. To 
enrich the understanding of parental choices regarding the 
type of education they send their children to, it is important to 
identify how studying in a Daara may impact positively or 
negatively children's prospects for the future. 
Policy and Programme Initiatives 
This paper examines recent child protection work implemented 
to protect children who beg on the streets as part of their 
education in Qur’ānic boarding schools and assesses the 
effectiveness of programme initiatives. Given the paucity in statistical data on children's education in religious 
institutions and the focus on one of several forms of Islamic education, effectiveness cannot be measured in 
numbers of students. A more qualitative assessment is needed of whether policies and programmes are based 
on a nuanced understanding of the circumstances in which children are sent to Daaras, of local notions of 
childhood and education and of alternatives to education in urban Daaras. 
International policy is premised on the idea that many Talibés have been trafficked and that children are 
forced to beg at the expense of their education. The presence of children in the streets during school hours 
supports the perception of children not being protected. This perception is based on a globalised notion of 
childhood according to which children should have a care-free childhood and be in school. 
Internationally-funded programmes that aim to rescue children from exploitation highlight opposing views on 
Talibé begging. While Marabouts and parents are concerned about attempts to curb children’s education in 
Qur’ānic schools and do not see children's mobility as trafficking, child rights advocates, NGOs and civil 
servants are concerned about practices they consider as a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC).
[17, 30]
 
National policy environments are ambiguous. On the one hand, several countries have legislated to address 
the problem of Talibé begging
[15]
 and the trafficking of children linked with Daaras.
[52]
 However, religious 
education is changing over time and the proliferation of different forms of Qur’ānic schools is a response to 
changing political economies, whether driven by Islamic clerics, the state or the international community. 
Preventing Talibés from Begging: prohibition, awareness raising and education 
Programmes to address Talibé begging began several decades ago but the international push for child 
protection legislation increased after the ratification of the CRC in 1989.
[47]
 The only country in West Africa to 
implement an outright ban on begging is the Gambia, where security forces routinely enforce the law against 
Marabouts who send Talibés begging.
[17, 52]
 International organisations advocate for similar measures in other 
countries,
[15]
 but enforcing laws requires support from political and religious leaders, as well as the general 
public. Most preventive measures target child trafficking. In Senegal the 'Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons 
and Related Practices and to Protect Victims' of 2005 devotes a section to forced begging and the vulnerability 
of children. Accordingly, anyone found guilty of organising or pressuring another person to beg can be fined or 
imprisoned. However, considering the scale of Daara education involving begging, few persons have been 
prosecuted. This suggests that the government is taking some action but falls short of protecting Talibés due 
to a lack of leadership and the thorny political issue of regulating religious education.
[15]
  
Other interventions seek to prevent begging by subsidising Daaras through food aid, clothing or assistance to 
construct better sleeping facilities. Some Marabouts also have received direct income support as incentives or 
compensation to stop sending their pupils out to beg. However, these interventions are being replaced by 
activities that target Talibés directly because of concerns that assistance to Marabouts could create incentives 
for Marabouts to relocate Daaras to urban areas.
[34, 44]
 Assistance to Marabouts can be seen on a par with 
Senegal. Neighbours' allegations of 
forcing children to beg resulted in the 
arrest of a man, who was then found to 
have trafficked children from Guinea 
Bissau. A few other Marabouts were 
awaiting trial for similar offenses.
[52] 
Guinea Bissau. The main traffickers come 
from Bafata and Gabu, where they 
operate openly and are protected by 
their status in the Muslim community.
[52] 
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Universal Primary Education policies that provide school lunches, school infrastructure in the form of school 
buildings and furniture and salaries for teachers. This is not only a thorny political issue globally but also 
nationally. Countries, such as Senegal, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad promote secular public education 
systems despite the popularity of Islamic schools. This has hindered state-driven reforms of religious 
education.
[50]
 Interventions by international organisations are likely to be seen as unwelcome interference with 
sovereign politics.
[30]2
 
Anti-trafficking initiatives supported by IPEC’s LUTRENA programme focused on capacity-building of 
government and non-governmental agencies addressing the trafficking of children. Current policy 
recommendations point to the need for further capacity-building 
in relation to services dealing with children who beg as part of 
their Qur’ānic studies.
[15, 45, 46, 47]
 In Guinea Bissau, for example, 
police officers have been trained to intercept groups of children 
who are, or are perceived to be, trafficked within the country or 
between countries.
[17, 47, 52]
 These children are repatriated to 
their village after a short stay in an NGO-run transit centre while 
their parents are being located.
[17]
 
Interventions also include awareness-raising campaigns targeting the 'supply-side', namely the parents or 
guardians who are assumed to be unaware of the extent to which their children beg, the level of corporal 
punishment or low attainment of religious knowledge among Talibés. However, this approach fails to take 
into account the diverse reasons underlying parents’ decisions to send a child to a Qur’ānic school. Parents 
may feel antipathy towards civil servants and NGOs implementing anti-trafficking measures if they see these 
efforts as attempts to reduce educational and social opportunities for their children.
[16, 17, 34]
 Awareness-raising 
campaigns also target the 'demand-side'
3
 to make the general public aware of exploitative practices and the 
fact that alms given to Talibés may not benefit the children.
[15, 16, 34]
 
Awareness-raising campaigns include press releases and public statements featured in national newspapers 
and on radio and TV programmes.
[34,47]
 Child rights activists may frame awareness-raising in terms of children's 
rights to education or to have a childhood. This framing is premised on a globalised notion of childhood 
according to which children lack protection and suffer when they are away from their family. Local authorities, 
including some Marabouts, are more likely to stress institutional failures pertaining to the under-performance 
of some Qur’ānic schools or the malpractice of Marabouts who are more interested in material gains than in 
teaching the Qur’ān to the students.
[17, p. 57]
 
Finally, anti-begging measures supported by international organisations have focused on education. Recent 
interventions have been targeted directly at Talibés, supporting a variety of combinations of secular and 
Qur’ānic education,
[16, 17, 53]
 as well as second chance education in the form of a condensed curriculum, a 
shorter alphabetisation programme or technical training.
[44, 45]
 Furthermore, interventions aim to enhance the 
access to education in rural areas. This is done by aiding parents economically through social transfers to 
ensure they can afford to keep children in school
[47]
 and by assisting Marabouts to return to rural areas. 
Child Protection Services 
By the late 1990s, child rights organisations and NGOs had taken over policy responses to Talibés begging and 
implemented programmes that put Talibés on a par with street children.
[34]
 NGO-driven response services to 
assist Talibés and other children begging on the streets have proliferated and a large number of NGOs are 
involved in the provision of such child protective services.
[17, 47] 
The provision of drop-in centres, shelters and 
                                                          
2 Please note that academic research is underway on the issue of parental preferences and religious education in Senegal, Mali and Niger. 
See http://www.institutions-africa.org/page/religious-education. 
3 'Demand-side' refers to the duty of Muslims to give alms and to the widespread popular belief that giving to poor children is a good 
deed that will be rewarded spiritually or materially. 
Senegal. A pilot project implemented by 
ENDA GRAF supported the return of one 
Marabou to his village by investing in 
buildings for the Daara, a well and training 
in new agricultural techniques. This was 
seen as a means to make village-based 
Daaras attractive to prevent parents from 
sending children to urban-based Daaras.
[44] 
13 
telephone hotlines is aimed at all children in vulnerable situations. The centres often provide material support 
in the form of food, clothing, health care, psychological support and legal advice.
[17, 22, 44, 47]
 Some centres also 
have staff who provide outreach services for Talibés and street children. Another initiative is to find 'foster 
mothers' for Talibés, i.e. to find a woman who is willing to take on the responsibility of feeding one Talibé 
every day, provide him with clothes and support the child emotionally.
[47]
 
Finally, some NGOs support the repatriation of Talibés found 
begging in the streets. Such programmes are often represented as 
rescue missions aiding children at risk who need assistance to 
return to their families. Repatriation and reintegration 
programmes have to be voluntary and need to include specialised 
psychosocial care and support and appropriate education, 
vocational training and livelihood options. Many poorly 
implemented reintegration programmes fail because they do not 
consider the educational, social and economic aspirations of 
parents and children.
[16, 17]
 There is a need to develop a broader 
range of educational and economic options for Talibés, including 
in the urban areas to which they have migrated. Sending them 
back home and expecting them to go to school cannot be the 
only option. 
Regularisation of Education in Daaras 
In some countries the reform of traditional Qur’ānic schools has created a viable alternative to secular state 
schools.
[16, 29]
 Yet, Marabouts are divided on the subject of regularising education in Daaras by integrating 
subjects from the public education system. Some see state schools as corrupting and uprooting children from 
their cultural values and Qur’ānic schools as places that teach humanistic values, while others see the 
advantage in combining Qur’ānic studies with a broader curriculum.
[1, 5] 
In Benin and Guinea Bissau there is 
broad support for the standardisation of the curriculum and of methods of teaching in Qur’ānic schools. 
Consultations with Marabouts reveal that they ask for assistance to provide the basic needs for children which 
normally are met by parents and guardians, or demand the same subsidies as government schools.
[cf. 3, 5, 16, 17]
 
With regard to the curriculum, modernised Daaras resemble Madāris.
[16] 
Reformed Qur’ānic schools, such as the Arabic schools, place emphasis on religious studies and some secular 
topics but use Arabic as the language of instruction. Modern schools, such as the Arabic-English and the 
Franco-Arab schools, cover most or all of the government curriculum in addition to studying the Qur’ān.
[1, 13, 17, 
19, 29, 34, 50]
 Some countries, such as Ghana, have government schools that offer a programme of religious and 
Arabic language studies, which is a trade-off between having teachers and textbooks paid for by the 
government and a curriculum that limits the number of hours allocated to studying the Qur’ān.
[13]
 In Mali, 
Chad and Senegal, students in Franco-Arab schools sit exams recognised by the state.
[16, 19, 50]
 As these are 
private schools, fees have to be paid. In Senegal, for example, fees of $5 to $ 15 were paid per seven-month 
school year.
[34]
 The teaching in these types of schools resembles the way in which children are taught in secular 
schools.  
Parents are generally positive about modern Qur’ānic schools because they see them as more efficient, as 
teaching children additional subjects to the Qur’ān and as inclusive because girls can also pursue Qur’ānic 
education.
[13, 34]
 What keeps some parents from sending their children to improved schools are the costs, but 
there is scope for developing Islamic schools further to offer an alternative to state schools for Muslim 
children.
[13]
  
Guinea Bissau. An eight-year-old Talibé 
who was repatriated from Senegal 
described how he had been lured to a 
reception centre by the promise of 
money, only to be trapped in the centre 
and repatriated one week later.
[17, p. 55] 
 
According to one government officer in 
Guinea Bissau, all they did was to take 
children from one punishment to 
another. Repatriated boys were given 
money to give to their fathers, which 
would be enough to buy rice for two 
weeks. Otherwise the children were not 
supported and rarely pursued education, 
technical training or found jobs.
[17, p. 40-42]
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Questions that Need Further Investigation 
 Why does uneven representation of ethnic groups occur in Daaras? How do gender (notions of masculinity), 
age, poverty and processes of marginalisation impact on uneven patterns of Daara attendance? 
 Examine the political economies of education to understand why the state has not issued – or does not 
enforce – legislation to regulate religious education? 
 How do parents choose a Daara? How do Marabouts recruit students? 
 How do parents respond to situations in which their children are exploited? How do such responses impact 
on common educational strategies? 
 Is the physical development of a Talibé different from that of his siblings back home or living with other 
relatives? 
 What are children's motivations for studying in Qur’ānic schools? 
 Do Talibé migration patterns reflect general migration flows in West Africa? 
 What do former Talibés do for a living? What are their career options and paths? 
 How do former Talibés integrate in migrant communities? 
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